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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
called the "common-enemy" doctrine, which allows the owner of land to
obstruct the flow of surface water on to his land. In Lunsford v. Stewart"
the Franklin County Court of Appeals held it was reasonable for the owner
of certain city property to fill -his lot up to grade thus preventing the surface
water from draining on to his lot from an adjoining lot. It is significant
that the court referred to the common-law rule and the civil-law rule, then
based its decision on the reasonable-use rule though an Ohio Supreme Court
decision had specifically held the common-law rule applied in cities. The
reasonable-use rule will certainly avoid the problem of determining when
certain property is rural and when it is urban and will permit the courts to
do justice by evaluating the circumstances of each case. One of the factors
to be considered is whether storm sewer facilities are available.
Title Policies
In Burks v. Louisville Title Ins. Co.31 the Summit County Court of Ap-
peals sustained a verdict and judgment in favor of the owner for the full
amount of his title guaranty policy. The owner recovered because a third
person had title to a portion of the land covered by the policy. The court
properly refused to restrict the land and covered by the policy construing the
description by metes and bounds in the owner's deed with a description in
the deed to the owner's grantor which was referred to in the owner's deed in
the customary way as "being that part of the premises. . as described in
deed recorded in Book ....' The amount awarded to the owner included
the cost to him of relocating his driveway, doing additional grading, and
for the delay in the construction of his home. The owner in this case pur-
chased an unimproved lot which was covered by a title guaranty policy for
$2,000, then neglected to obtain additional coverage with respect to the
improvements which he placed on this lot. Persons who purchase un-
improved property and then improve it should be careful to increase the
amount of their title policies if they wish to be adequately protected.
ROBERT N. COOK
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE :
Aid for the Aged Liens
It is rather unusual that in the first year for this new subject there is a
public assistance case to report. In Hausser v. Ebinger,1 the Ohio Supreme
Court held that under the provisions of Section 5105.13 of the Revised
'°95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953).
"95 Ohio App. 509, 121 N.E.2d 94 (1953).
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Code, a married person who applies to the state for aid for the aged thereby
obligates his or her estate, upon death, to repay the state not only the amount
of aid received 'by him or her, but also the amount of aid, if any, received
by his or her spouse. It was said that the statutory obligation to repay the
aid furnished to the spouse is in the nature of a suretyship obligation with-
out consideration moving directly to such married person, but, where the
estate of the spouse is sufficent to repay the aid so furnished to the spouse,
the married person or his or her estate is entitled to exoneration as to such
aid. As the opinion indicates, no obligation arises during the lifetime of
the recipient of aid, but of course the heirs will be affected upon the re-
cipient's death. There is some political opposition to this lien provision
in the Ohio law, but there does not appear to be any immediate danger of
its being eliminated. A number of other state laws in this field contain a
similar provision, but it is by no means a uniform requirement.
Unemployment Insurance
There have been some very significant decisions relating to the unem-
ployment insurance program in Ohio during the past year. Noticeably
more than in some of the prior years that come to mind, the courts seem to
have adopted an increasingly liberal attitude toward the interpretation of
the Ohio Act.
1. Vacation Shut-down - Availability for Work
One of the most interesting problems dealt with concerned the eligi-
bility of certain workers for benefits during periods of plant shut-down for
vacation purposes. Many industries find it necessary or convenient to
grant vacations all at once, and in these cases the contract with the union
specifies the period of the shut-down and which employees shall have vaca-
tion with pay. For those who do not qualify for pay, usually because of
the length of time on the job, it is interesting to speculate whether the
period in question is a vacation or an enforced lay-off. In any event, the
Ohio courts seem to have found one reason or another for denying benefits
in most of these instances.
* This heading is new in this year's issue, having been adopted to coincide with
the topical heading now being used in the Reporter System of the West Publish-
ing Company. Included under this heading will be material relating to the Public
Assistance programs (aid to the aged, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children,
and aid to the disabled, maternal and child welfare, medical care legislation, and
vocational rehabilitation). The bulk of the material, however, will relate to unem-
ployment insurance, which in the past has been a separate heading. Old age and
survivor's insurance and railroad retirement benefits also come within the scope of
the heading, but these are exclusively federal programs and there is likely to be little,
if any, state material relating to these subjects.
1 161 Ohio St. 192, 118 N.E.2d 522 (1954).
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In Cambridge Glass Co. v. B.U.C., 2 the Court of Appeals for Guernsey
County took refuge in the idea that any layoff during the period of plant
shut-down is controlled by the agreement with the union and nothing else.
Actually, the contract in this case was industry-wide and did not require a
plant shut-down for the vacation period but simply permitted the employer
such a choice. Exactly how a private contract can alter or avoid the express
terms of a state statute is not entirely clear. The court went so far as to
suggest that the contract would be abrogated if workers who did not qualify
for vacation pay could get unemployment benefits. This reasoning of
course, ignores the fact that the state law contains no provision to protect
contracts of this nature; and it is equally difficult to find just how the
contract is affected by the circumstance that some workers might be able
to qualify for a benefit that is only a fraction of the pay which they would
receive if work were available during the period in question.
The Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas County, in Gopp v. Board of
Retiew,3 held -that during the shut-down period the claimant was volun-
tarily unemployed and furthermore was not available for work and had
failed to establish that she was actively seeking work. There is no express
requirement that a worker's unemployment be involuntary under the terms
of the Ohio Act, although that is the premise underlying many of the eligi-
bility requirements and disqualification provisions contained in Section
4141.29 of the Revised Code. The soundest basis for the decision in this
case is the court's conclusion that watching the want ads in the paper did not
fulfill the requirement of actively seeking work.4
In contrast to these two decisions, the Trumbull County Common Pleas
Court held that where a collective bargaining agreement provided for a
paid vacation after a stated period of employment and permitted the em-
ployer to shut down the plant, but also provided that the employer would
attempt to provide employment on maintenance or other work for those
not entitled to vacation benefits, an employee who was not entitled to
vacation benefits and who sought employment with the employer in ques-
tion and elsewhere during the vacation period without success, was entitled
to benefits.5 In so holding, the court followed what it considered to be the
majority view in other jurisdictions and took issue with the earlier holdings
of other Ohio courts.
2CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8411 (1953).
'CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] g 8416 (1954).
'There is also a suggestion in the opinion in this case that the claimant, being on
"vacation," albeit without pay, was not unemployed in any event; but earlier in the
same opinion the court distinctly said that the claimant "must be considered totally
unemployed." The latter analysis appears to be more in keeping with the facts as
they apply to the express definition contained in the law.
'Yobe v. Sherwin Williams Co., 122 N.E.2d 202 (Trumbull Com. P1. 1954).
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The last word was had by the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court in
Barrick v. Board of Review,6 which adopted the voluntary unemployment
theory and distinguished the Yobe case on the basis of the provision in the
contract for employment in maintenance work.
There is much to be said, of course, for the reasoning of the Trumbull
County court, which in truth is basically inconsistent with the theories on
which the other decisions have been based. If ineligibilty is to be found in
these shut-down cases, it had best be based on the express provisions of the
statute, as happened in the Gopp case when the court found that there
had not been an active search for work. Perhaps the stronger reasoning
will eventually prevail in Ohio, but in the meantime there is no doubt that
the majority of the Ohio courts adhere to the view that appears to be in the
minority elsewhere. The Yobe decision may become a landmark in any
event for its obvious value to the draftsmen of collective bargaining agree-
ments.
2. Active Search for Work
In another interesting series of cases, the question of what constitutes an
"active search for work" received careful scrutiny. It was held, for in-
stance, that where the uncontradicted testimony of the claimant established
that as an unemployed seasonal employee of a canning factory in a small
town, she had visited at least two prospective employers each week, the
decision of the Board of Review that she had not actively sought work and
therefore should .be denied benefits, was against the weight of the evidence,
unreasonable and unlawful.7 Likewise, a claimant was held to be eligible
where she reported at least two contacts with large employers in her dis-
trict and had not been referred to any employer wanting her type of ser-
vice. The court indicating that she was not obliged to search for types
of jobs in which she had no training or capacity." In order to conduct an
active search, moreover, it is not required to seek employment in a town
12 or 15 miles from the village in which the claimant lived and previously
had been employed.'
'CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8447 (1954).
'Nofzinger v. LaChoy Food Products Div., 116 N.E. 2d 773 (Fulton Com. P1.
1953). The court mentioned, but gave little weight to, the conclusion of the
referee that the claimant seemed to him more interested in complying with the
statutory requirements than in getting a job. The law, of course, does not require
an examination of the state of the claimant's mind in the course of conducting her
search; nor does it prescribe the proper amount of zeal to be exhibited in the pursuit
of employment.
'Mills v. Marquette Metal Products Co., CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8450 (Wayne
Com. P1. 1954). Accord: Rychener v. LaChoy Food Products Div., 116 N.E.2d 777
(Fulton Com. P1. 1953).
9Schroeder v. LaChoy Food Products Div., 116 N.E.2d 775 (Fulton Com. Pl. 1953).
[Spring
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
3. Refusal of Suitable Work
In one of its most significant decisions in this field in recent years, the
Ohio Supreme Court, in Tary v. Board of Revtiwezu 0 held that where a
claimant is a long standing and conscientious member of a religion which
teaches as one of its tenets that secular work on Saturday is a violation of
the law of God, and where such claimant did not engage in work on Satur-
day in his last employment, his rejection in good faith of proffered em-
ployment which required work on Saturday was excused since such work
involved a risk to the claimant's morals and therefore was not "suitable"
as that term is defined in the law. In an able opinion, concurred in by
Judges Taft, Zimmerman, and Stewart, Judge Lamneck, the former State
Director of Welfare, pointed out that in determining whether work was
suitable under Section 4141.29 of the Revised Code, the administrator
must consider the degree of risk to the claimant's morals, the test thereof
being subjective and dependent upon the bona fide conscientious beliefs of
the individual and his sense of duty. Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc.,"
was properly distinguished on the basis of the "suitable work" provision
which was not in the law prior to 1949.12
In other cases relating to the refusal of work, it was held that where the
claimant was offered a job on condition that she relinquish her seniority
rights with her prior employer, such a condition was unreasonable and her
refusal to accept the job was justified;"3 and where the claimant went to
the employer's home at the time indicated by the employment service
and spent half an hour on a very cold afternoon trying to find the lady she
was supposed to see, it was held that there had been a sufficient compli-
10161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
U 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946).
A fact which must have given heart to the supporters of the important 1949
amendments, which dearly were designed to liberalize the benefit provisions of the
Ohio Act. Judge Hart's dissenting opinion, with Judges Weygandt and Middleton
concurring, urged the application of the doctrine of Chambers v. Owets-Ames-
Kimball Co., 146 Ohio St 559, 67 N.E.2d 439 (1946), wherein a claimant was
found ineligible for refusing to accept an offer of work on the ground that such
acceptance would violate the rules of his union and might result in his expulsion
therefrom. Judge Hart contended that "if the work was properly suitable for an-
other person as to morals, it was so suitable for the claimant so far as the character of
the work itself was concerned." This would have been a novel way indeed to render
the amendment ineffective. If applied literally, a youth or a slip of a girl might
be required to accept work normally done only by the huskiest of men, such as in
a foundry; any number of incongruous situations can be imagined without difficulty,
and the claimant's refusal in every instance would be on pain of losing his right to
unemployment benefits. Incidentally, it was Judge Hart who wrote the majority
opinion in the Chambers case, with Judges Zimmerman and Bell dissenting.
'Hobbs v. Board of Review, 122 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio App. 1953).
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ance with the referral to avoid disqualification;'" but where the claimant
refused an offer in Cincinnati, where she had previously worked, because
she was staying with her husband on a farm during his vacation and did




The voluntary quit disqualification also received a great deal of atten-
tion in the courts. In Woodward v. Mullins Mfg. Co.,", it was held that
failure to report for work until nearly a month after the termination of the
worker's 30-day leave of absence amounted to a quit, and the claimant was
held to be barred from benefits by the terms of the statute. Where the
record disclosed, however, that a female worker had undergone several ex-
periences while proceeding to and from her place of employment during
the night season which were calculated to create a reasonable concern for
her own safety, it was held that her bona fide refusal of a transfer from
daytime employment to the night shift was justified and did not constitute
quitting work without just cause.'"
Where the claimant testified that she quit because she was being com-
pelled to work overtime to the detriment of her health, no other evidence
being presented, it was held that the cause was just and the board's decision
denying benefits was clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.'
Likewise, a similar result was reached where the claimant had quit because
of dissatisfaction with the working conditions, even though she had en-
dured the conditions complained of for approximately two years." How-
ever, a reprimand by the foreman is not considered good cause for quitting,0
4 Williams v. Administrator, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohiol 5 4812 (Trumbull Com. P1.
1954).
" Tucker v. Administrator, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8452 (Hamilton Com. P1.
1954).
CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8414 (Trumbull Com. P1. 1954).
"Reeves v. Board of Review, 118 N.E.2d 159 (Cuyahoga Com. P1. 1953). The
offer of a transfer was occasioned by the fact that work was not available on the day
in question in claimant's department. It was established that the locality between the
claimant's home and her place of work, through which she had to walk, was a "bad
neighborhood," and she had been attacked on one occasion and followed on another.
" Hoffer v. State, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8454 (Licking Com. P1. 1954).
"Redmond v. Harwood Screw Products, Inc., CCH U.1. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8453 (Clark
Com. P1. 1954). Among the conditions complained of were inadequate seating and
rest rooms, no lunch room, and dangerous machinery unprotected by safety devices.
The court accepted the claimant's explanation that economic necessity had forced her
to continue working under these conditions until worsening conditions and an assur-
ance of another job induced her to act.
" Patterson v. Board of Review, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8413 (Trumbull Com. Pl.
1954).
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and neither is a domestic condition requiring claimant to be closer to his
home where the condition described was the same as when he took the job.21
5. Labor Dispute Disqualification
Workers engaged in a slow-down of production during wage negotia-
tions, who became unemployed when management shut down the plant,
were held by the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court to be dis-
qualified on the basis that their unemployment was due to a labor dispute
rather than a lock-out.22 The court reasoned that the slow-down was part
of the labor dispute and that the shut-down was compelled by economic
necessity, a problem somewhat akin to the time-worn controversy con-
cerning the chicken and the egg.
In Allen v. Youngstown Mun. Ry. Co.,23 the Mahoning County Court of
Appeals held that maintenance and repair workers employed by a firm
operating a bus system who were notified that they would not be em-
ployed for the duration of a strike then in progress called by the bus drivers,
were unemployed because of a labor dispute and disqualified under the
terms of the Ohio Act even though they were not members of the striking
union. So long as the strike occurs at the plant or establishment where the
claimant is employed, this result is virtually unavoidable under the Ohio
provision, which omits the language contained in the laws of many of the
other states imposing disqualification only in those instances where the
claimant is "interested" in the dispute, or involved therein.
Discharge for Just Cause
Failure to appear for work on July 4 plus six days absence in a period
of six months, was considered not to amount to excessive absenteeism, and
it was held that a discharge based thereon was not for just cause in connec-
tion with the claimant's work so as to result in disqualification. 24  But a
discharge for non-payment of union dues where such action was required
under a collective bargaining agreement, is for just cause and does bar the
payment of benefits.25 And where the claimant had frequented the em-
Cozert v. Board of Review, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8451 (Meigs Com. P1. 1954).
"Aberathy v. Board of Review, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] S 8445, 1954).
' CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 9 8449 (1954), reversing the lower court's decision in
the same case and overruling the earlier case of Diaz v. Koppers Co., CCH U.I. Serv.
[Ohio] 9 8295. A similar conclusion was reached by the Scioto County Court of
Appeals in Cornell v. Bailey, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8423 (1954), where the
claimants were laid off because of greatly reduced operations in a wholesale grocery
business resulting from a strike of the company's drivers.
- Bledsoe v. Administrator, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8428 (Trumbull Com. P1.
1954).
' Dennis v. Board of Review, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 9 8429 (Perry Com. P1. 1954).
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ployer's locker room to smoke, having fallen asleep on at least one occasion,
his subsequent discharge was considered to be for just cause within the
meaning of the statute, with resulting disqualification .2
Experience Rating Questions
On the question of the liability of a successor in interest for contribu-
tions owed by his predecessor, it was held that the State's lien for unpaid
contributions filed two years after the successor had acquired the business
was not effective where the lien had not been recorded, and no notice given
to the successor, prior to such purchase.21 With regard to the transfer of
experience rating accounts, the Franklin County Common Pleas Court ruled
that a company which took over approximately 93 % of another company's
business was not entitled to the predecessor's tax rate under the provisions
contained in the Ohio law prior to 1952 .8 Since the 1952 amendment,
even partial transfer is permitted without losing the benefit of the prede-
cessor's experience.
Procedure
Several procedural questions were settled during the year. In Miller v.
B.U.C., the Ohio Supreme Court held an administrative agency has no
partisan interest in its decisions and may not appeal from a judgment which
in effect vacates its decisions unless expressly authorized by law to do so.
The Board of Review, the court said, is not an "interested party" as defined
in the act for the purpose of appeal. In some state acts the authority to
appeal is expressly given. Also, it was held that an appeal to the court
will be dismissed where the claimant failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies by skipping an appeal to the board of review; 0 and the required
notice of appeal to the court from the board of review must set forth the
particular errors or omissions relied upon in order to effect an appeal.3 '
EDWIN R. TEPLE
'Stititez v. B.U.C., CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8430 (Hamilton Com. P1. 1953).
" B.U.C. v. Stultz, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8444 (Lawrence Com. PL 1954).
'Apex Smelting Co. v. Cornell, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8434 (1954). The de-
cision was based upon the theory that in order to obtain a predecessor's experience
rate, the business must be transferred in its entirety.
' 160 Ohio St. 561, 117 N.E.2d 427 (1954).
"
0Miles v. B.U.C, CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8432 (Franklin Com. P1. 1954). The
statute is quite specific on this point.
" McGee v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., CCH U.I. Serv. [Ohio] 5 8446 (Mus-
kingum Com. P1. 1954). The court pointed out that as in any other case, the ad-
verse party is precluded from making a direct answer unless such a specification is
made.
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